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PAY EQUITY: A CHILD OF THE 80s GROWS UP
ROBERT H. COHEN
INTRODUCTION
And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of
Israel, and say unto them:
When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons unto the LORD,
according to thy valuation, then thy valuation shall be for the male
from twenty years old even unto sixty years old, even thy valuation
shall be fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary. And
if it be a female, then thy valuation shall be thirty shekels.'
From biblical times, then, the undervaluation of women has existed,
and it still exists today. Consider, for example, the case of Marilyn
Jancey. She was a cafeteria worker for the Everett, Massachusetts
School District for sixteen years, from 1973 until 1989.2 After she and
her thirty-four coworkers were denied a raise in 1987, they joined to-
gether and formed Local #26 of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers'
Union.3
Upon recognition and a new collective bargaining agreement grant-
ing a pay raise, the School Board reduced the cafeteria workers'
hours, effectively nullifying any benefit of the raise.4 A hearing before
the Civil Service Commission forced a compromise, mandating that
seniority determine the number of hours worked.5 Still dissatisfied
with their overall pay, the union decided to evaluate the cafeteria
workers' job description by comparing it to other restaurants in the
area.6 Upon comparison, they found that Ms. Jancey and her co-
workers were highly skilled; they were responsible for feeding six to
seven thousand students a day; they were responsible for menu or-
ganizing; and they maintained all of the kitchen equipment.' Further-
more, the union hired a job evaluation team, which found that the
cafeteria workers' jobs were equivalent to those of the school custodi-
ans, but that the custodians made between $10.76 and $12.73 per hour
while the former earned between $6.44 and $6.85 per hour.8
1. Lev. 27: 1-4; see also Michael Evan Gold, A Dialogue on Comparable Worth 3
(1983) (drawing the analogy between the biblical quote and the current undervalua-
tion of women in the workplace).
2. Jancey v. Everett School Comm., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1314, 1315-
16 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1992).
3. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Educa-
tion and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Marilyn Jancey Marblehead),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Jancey Testimony].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Jancey v. Everett School Comm., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1314, 1322-
23 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1992).
8. Id at 1322.
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The predominately female cafeteria workers went to court, bringing
a cause of action under the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act.9 Under the
Massachusetts Act, an employer is barred from discriminating in the
payment of wages for work that is "of like or comparable character."'10
The judge decided in favor of the cafeteria workers" because their
jobs were comparable to the custodians' and they uniformly were paid
at a lower wage rate than were the custodians. 12 The total of the judg-
ment awarded in early 1994, including damages, costs, and attorney's
fees was $1.1 million.' 3
Ms. Jancey's story is not unique. In 1992, American women earned
only seventy-one percent of the wages earned by men.' 4 Pay differen-
tials appeared across race as well as gender lines. For example, Afri-
can American men earned seventy-two percent of the salary of white
men, while African American women received only sixty-four percent
of white men's salary.' 5 Hispanic men and women were also un-
derpaid, the former earning sixty-five percent and the latter fifty-five
percent of what white men earned. 6
9. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 105A (Law. Co-op 1994).
10. Id.
11. Jancey, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1334-35.
12. Id. at 1335.
13. Jancey Testimony, supra note 3.
14. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Educa-
tion and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of John Sturdivant), available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Sturdivant Testimony]. It is clear,
furthermore, that the wage gap exists even after accounting for education, job experi-
ence, and "other measurable differences between men and women." Robert T.
Michael, Are Pay Equity Plans an Answer?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 23, 1989, at
3B. But cf Robert Rector, The Pseudo-Science of Comparable Worth: Phrenology for
Modem 7mes, The Heritage Foundation Reports, Feb. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Arcnws File (noting that secretaries earn almost the same wages as an
auto mechanic and that telephone operators earn about the same as bus drivers and
10% more than garbage collectors). Rector also notes that secretaries make 92% of
the median wage for professionals, and their pay is in the top half for skilled blue
collar craft workers. Id.
15. Sturdivant Testimony, supra note 14.
16. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Educa-
tion and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Michelle Leber), available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Leber Testimony]. The astonishing
numbers continue: individually, women lose over $420,000 during their lifetime due
to pay equity; on an annual basis, the collective loss due to wage discrimination
against women is over $100 billion; among college graduates, white men earned ap-
proximately $9,000 more in 1992 than did men of color, and approximately $13,000
more than their female colleagues. Id. Furthermore, in 1991, female nurses earned
10% less than male nurses, female managers earned 34% less than male managers,
and female elementary school teachers earned 14% less than male elementary school
teachers. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Edu-
cation and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Judith L. Lichtman), avail-
able in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Lichtman Testimony].
Finally, "[iut should be noted that all other industrial countries with the exception of
Japan have a smaller wage gap between men and women than the United States."
Leber Testimony, supra.
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The gap between wages closed slightly during the third quarter of
1993, with white women full-time employees earning seventy-six per-
cent of the wages earned by white men. 7 Similarly, African Ameri-
can women earned sixty-seven cents, and Hispanic women sixty-four
cents, for every dollar earned by a white man."8
One author provides a basis for these skewed figures:
A significant reason for the persistence of the gender wage gap is
the prevalence of occupational segregation by sex and race. This
segregation is both horizontal (the crowding of women into low-
paying occupations such as clerical work, health care, and service
work) and vertical (stratification of male-dominated occupations by
gender, with women occupying the bottom rungs of the workforce
hierarchy). 19
But not everyone agrees that the wage disparities are due to any dis-
crimination or intentional job segregation. Robert Rector, Policy An-
alyst at the Heritage Foundation, attacks the theory that women are
barred from entering predominantly male jobs.20 He notes that if this
were true, there would be evidence that a large number of women
were competing for a small number of jobs.2' But this is not the
case.22 Furthermore, Rector refutes the idea that cultural bias induces
employers to undervalue traditional female work.23 This assertion, he
says, is undermined by the fact that employers of traditional female
jobs are not earning huge profits.24 If they really were undervaluing
work, "employers should be reaping a windfall bonus due to the un-
paid productivity they gain from women's labor."'  Instead, he attrib-
utes the wage gap to hard-to-measure factors, such as differences in
17. Id.
18. Marion Crain, Confronting the Structural Character of Working Women's Eco-
nomic Subordination: Collective Action vs. Individual Rights Strategies, 3 Kan. J.L &
Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1994 at 26, 26 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers: Third Quarter 1993
(Oct. 28, 1993)). Furthermore, the wage disparity continued on strictly racial lines
with black women earning 90% of black men's wages, while Hispanic women received
92% of Hispanic men's wages. Id. at 33 n.2.
19. Id. at 27. Furthermore, Crain reports that horizontal stratification affects
roughly three-fifths of all working women who occupy jobs that are at least 75% fe-
male. Id. Female sex-segregated jobs include: secretaries (98% female); bookkeepers
(91% female); nursing aides (88% female); cashiers (79% female); textile sewing
machine operators (90% female); and waitpersons (80% female). Id. at 33 n.7. Wo-
men's median weekly earnings for the above occupations range from $178 (wait-
resses) to $299 (secretaries). Id. In contrast, male sex-segregated jobs-retail sales
(85%), machinists (97%), protective services (89%), construction workers (99%), and
janitors (78%)-have median weekly earnings ranging from $275 to S550. Id.
20. Rector, supra note 14.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id
24. Id.
25. Id.
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long-term work expectations, family commitments and interest in
management positions bringing financial reward.26
Starting in the late 1970s and increasing in the early 1980s, many
feminists and economists felt that the best way to improve the pay
disparity among workers was through comparable worth. The Na-
tional Committee on Pay Equity defines comparable worth as "the
effort to raise wages for female dominated jobs. '27 Specifically, com-
parable worth seeks to eliminate pay discrimination by using objective
factors to evaluate all jobs, from nurses to truck drivers.28
In American Nurses' Association v. State of Illinois,9 Judge Posner
provided comparable worth's historical and cognitive premises. He
stated that the historical premise is that women were steered into cer-
tain low-paying jobs solely because they were women and that
through comparable worth, those artificial barriers could be re-
moved.3" The cognitive premise, according to Posner, is that analyti-
cal techniques do exist for determining the worth of jobs involving
different levels of skill, effort, risk, and responsibility so comparable
worth can serve an important function in equalizing income.31
The debate over comparable worth has been fierce ever since its
inception, and the debate probably will continue for as long as compa-
rable worth is being considered. Those in favor of comparable worth
argue that "[p]ay equity is a matter of fundamental fairness" and a
"matter of economic necessity."32 Furthermore, because two out of
three adults in this country living in poverty are women, comparable
worth would be a primary factor in reducing the poverty rate.33
26. Id.
27. Rita Mae Kelly & Jane Bayes, Comparable Worth, Pay Equity, and Public
Policy 4 (1988) (citing National Committee on Pay Equity, The Wage Gap: Myths and
Facts 1 n.d.); see also American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir.
1986) (Judge Posner, the formidable Law and Economics proponent, defines compa-
rable worth as, "the movement to raise the ratio of wages in traditionally women's
jobs to wages in traditionally men's jobs").
28. See Michael, supra note 14, at 3B.
29. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
30. American Nurses', 783 F.2d at 719.
31. Id.
32. Alan Cranston, The Proposed Equity Act of 1985, 36 Lab. L.J. 131, 144 (1985).
33. Id.
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The weight of the legal and political authority, however, has been
against the implementation of comparable worth? In American
Nurses',3 5 Judge Posner noted that
virtually the entire difference in the average hourly wage of men
and women, including that due to the fact that men and women tend
to be concentrated in different types of job [sic], can be explained
by the fact that most women take considerable time out of the labor
force in order to take care of their children. As a result they tend to
invest less in their "human capital" (earning capacity); and since
part of any wage is a return on human capital, they tend therefore
to be found in jobs that pay less.36
Therefore, according to this theory, because women are not perma-
nently in the labor force, while men generally are, employers will not
invest as much in women and, consequently, their wages will be lower.
Comparable worth, furthermore, is not a constitutional issue. If an
employer intentionally underpays an employee because of her gender
or race, she may seek redress under either the Equal Pay Act' or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 Additionally, employers
acting under color of law who discriminate among employees may vio-
late the employees' 14th Amendment equal protection rights.39 Com-
parable worth, on the other hand, seeks to attack historical and
institutional practices that undervalue jobs traditionally held by wo-
men and minorities. A lack of comparable worth does not necessarily
reflect an intent by the employer to discriminate. Therefore, the pres-
ence of pay inequity on its own does not raise constitutional
questions.4°
This Note assumes the validity of comparable worth and proceeds
to analyze the best vehicle for its implementation, considering the in-
34. See Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1728, 1729 (1986) (stating that "[President Reagan] himself
dismiss[es] the notion [of comparable worth] as a 'cockamamie idea'") (quoting U.S.
Presses Brief in Job Value Case, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 17, 1985, at A7); see also Mark R.
Killingsworth, The Economics of Comparable Worth 45 (1990) (stating that the "con-
centration of women in low-paid jobs is not necessarily evidence of employer discrim-
ination; and equal pay for jobs of comparable worth is not necessarily an appropriate
standard for evaluating pay differences among jobs").
35. 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1986).
36. Id. Judge Posner went on to conclude that "the issue of comparable worth is
not of the sort that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently or that we should
lightly assume has been given to us to resolve by Title VII or the Constitution." Id. at
720 (citations omitted); see also Rector, supra note 14 (stating that "America seldom
has seen a policy proposal which, through apparently well intentioned, would be as
destructive as comparable worth").
37. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); see infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); see infra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
39. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783
F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that no violation of equal protection exists unless
there is intentional discrimination).
40. Thus, as the intent of the employer is not at issue, this Note does not address
any potential constitutional claims that employees may have.
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terests of the individual workers. 4 1 Employees get the most benefit
from comparable worth when they introduce it, as they have the abil-
ity to work directly with management to ensure effective implementa-
tion. By joining labor organizations, workers-especially women-
can improve their economic status by influencing management
decisions.
Part I of this Note analyzes current federal legislation to see what, if
any, causes of action plaintiffs can bring successfully under compara-
ble worth. Part II looks at new legislation introduced into the House
of Representatives during the summer of 1994 that attempted to fed-
eralize the concept of comparable worth. Finally, Part III suggests
that comparable worth should be implemented, but not through fed-
eral legislation. As an alternative, this Note proposes that individual
employees join together in unions and exert pressure over their em-
ployers to get comparable worth pay increases. Only through union
involvement and collective bargaining can the goal of increasing wo-
men's and minorities' pay be met without government intervention
and increased regulation of the job market.
I. CuRRENr FEDERAL LEGISLA-ION
There are currently two federal acts that address equal pay for men
and women: the Equal Pay Act of 196342 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.43 Both of these acts, while important in the fight
against discrimination in the workplace, do not provide a cause of ac-
tion for comparable worth.
A. The Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA") provides that employers can-
not discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying
lower wages to women for performing the same work as men.44 To
41. For an excellent look at both sides of the comparable worth debate, see Gold,
supra note 1 (moderating a fictional debate between a proponent and an opponent of
comparable worth); see also Kelly & Bayes, supra note 27 (editing a number of arti-
cles on different comparable worth programs throughout the country); Killingsworth,
supra note 34 (providing a complex economic analysis); Judith Olans Brown, et al.,
Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 127 (1986) (analyzing the reasons for the failure of comparable worth
under Title VII); Weiler, supra note 34, at 1793-1807 (analyzing the viability of feder-
ally-mandated comparable worth); Cranston, supra note 32 (examining the proposed
Pay Equity Act of 1985); Janice R. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based
Wage Discrimination, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 655 (1984) (calling for judicial activism with
respect to Title VII).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) provides:
No employer.., shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at
[Vol. 631466
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establish a prima facie case under the EPA, the plaintiff must compare
the jobs held by the female and male employees and show that the
jobs are substantially similar.4" The plaintiff, then, has the burden of
proving "that an employer pays different wages to employees of oppo-
site sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility.' "I
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any pay dif-
ferential is justified by one of four statutory exceptions. 47 The EPA
provides that a pay discrepancy is valid if it is "made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex."8 Basically, the defendant
must show that sex played no role in the lower wage.49
1. Limitations on Recovery
Courts have further refined their analysis of alleged discrimination
under the EPA by providing that "[t]he jobs held by the employees of
opposite sexes need not be identical; rather, they need only be sub-
stantially equal."50 Furthermore, the plaintiff does not need to show
discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant, but only that her
pay was lower than a comparable male's pay. 1
The courts have, despite their broad reading of the EPA require-
ments, also read the fourth statutory exception, any factor other than
sex, very generally, thus reducing the effectiveness the Equal Pay Act.
For example, in Homer v. Mary Institute,' the court allowed a male
gym teacher to be paid higher wages than a female gym teacher be-
cause he demanded a greater salary upon hiring than his female coun-
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
45. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir.
1992).
46. Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omit-
ted)); see Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1532; see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (noting that the plaintiff has the burden of proof).
47. Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
49. Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590.
50. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir.
1992).
51. Id. at 1532.
52. 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1980).
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terpart.53 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that "an
employer may consider the market place value of the skills of a partic-
ular individual when determining his or her salary. '5 4 Similarly, in
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.,55 a male salesperson was al-
lowed a higher pay than a female salesperson because men's clothes
were of higher quality and produced a greater profit margin.56 Be-
cause Robert Hall's method of determining salary did not show the
"clear pattern of discrimination" necessary to require correlating the
wages of each worker with his or her performance, the court allowed
the company's affirmative defense of "any factor other than sex. ' '57
In addition to the court-imposed limitations, two statutory limita-
tions reduce the effectiveness of the EPA. First, there is "red cir-
cling."58 "ITIhe term 'red circle' describes 'certain unusual, higher
than normal, wage rates which are maintained for many reasons.' "I'
An example of legitimate red circling is when an employer transfers
an employee from a skilled job to a less demanding job during an
economic downturn but continues to pay the employee the higher
wage in the hope of keeping him/her until conditions improve.60
When a claimant identifies a legitimately red circled employee as a
comparator, the employer will have a valid affirmative defense.6
Although red circling is a reasonable limitation, it further reduces the
EPA's ability to combat pay inequity because employers merely have
to explain why the man is getting paid more than the women to be
relieved of liability.
Second, the statute limits a plaintiff's chance of recovery by impos-
ing a geographical limitation.62 That is, those employees against
whom plaintiffs compare themselves must work in the same "estab-
lishment" as the claimants.63 "Establishment" has been defined by
53. Id. at 714.
54. Homer, 613 F.2d at 714 (citations omitted).
55. 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 594-95.
57. Id. at 597.
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.26 (1994).
59. Gosa v. Bryce Hospital, 780 F.2d 917, 918 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1620.26 (1994)). It is clear that "Congress intended to include this practice as a
factor other than sex that explains a wage differential and constitutes an affirmative
defense." Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 595 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 687-
89; see also Maxwell v. City of Tbcson, 803 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the four statutory exceptions are affirmative defenses that the employer must prove).
60. H.R. Rep. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 689.
61. Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
63. Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590 (citing Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1975)). In Goose Creek, however, the court recognized
that there are instances where an "establishment" can include more than one physical
plant, placing the emphasis on central control. Id. at 56-58; see also Marshall v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 605 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that all schools in a school
[Vol. 631468
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the Secretary of Labor as a "distinct physical place of business rather
than... an entire business or 'enterprise' which may include several
separate places of business."'  If the court strictly interprets establish-
ment, the plaintiff will have a more difficult time proving wage dis-
crimination under the Equal Pay Act because women may be
separated physically from their higher-paid male counterparts.6
2. Role of Comparable Worth
Because courts have been so restrictive in their application of the
EPA,' "comparable worth" claims under the Act will often fail.
Under current interpretation, plaintiffs must show that their jobs are
exactly, or almost exactly, the same as jobs performed by men.67
Comparable worth, however, is intended to raise the wages of women
performing jobs that are not identical to those of men, but that are
similar in skills, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.' Thus,
the EPA generally does not provide a cause of action for comparable
worth.69 As a result, a bill was introduced in the House of Represent-
atives last summer that suggested amendments to the EPA providing
equal pay for similar jobs.70 That new bill, The Fair Pay Act of 1994,
would provide for comparable worth throughout the country.71 While
potentially beneficial, the best route for the implementation of com-
parable worth is not through federal intervention, but through collec-
tive bargaining on an employer-by-employer basis.
district were a single establishment); Brownlee v. Gay & Taylor, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
347, 352 (D. Kan. 1985) (stating that pay comparisons should be made at different
geographical locations providing there is central control of salary administration and
job assignments).
64. Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (1993)).
65. Goose Creek, 519 F.2d at 57-58.
66. See Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706,714 (8th Cir. 1980); Hodgson v. Robert
Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir. 1973).
67. Lichtman Testimony, supra note 16.
68. Kelly & Bayes, supra note 27, at 4.
69. But cf. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970) (conclud-
ing that although Congress chose to require equal pay for "equal" rather than "com-
parable" work, Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not require that the jobs be
identical, but only that they be substantially equal); Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303
F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (stating that equal work does not mean identical
work and that different tasks that are only incidental and occasional would not justify
a wage differential). These cases, however, indicate a high water mark in the court's
thinking and do not provide for comparable worth under the Equal Pay Act.
70. See H.R. Rep. No. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, BTX103 File.
71. Id-
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B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
To combat discrimination against women and racial minorities in
the workplace,72 Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.73 Title VII provides that employers may not discriminate in em-
ployment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,74 and thus, like the EPA, prohibits employers from engaging in
sex-based wage discrimination.
Discrimination under Title VII comes in two forms: disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact. Courts have delineated the elements of a
prima facie case for both forms of discrimination, and it is necessary to
analyze these elements to show what a successful plaintiff claiming
pay discrimination must prove.
1. Disparate Treatment
An employer engages in disparate treatment discrimination when it
"overtly accords different treatment in some employment practice to
individuals based solely on their race, sex, religion, or national ori-
gin."'75 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,76 the Supreme Court
laid out the shifting burdens of proof that must be met to prove that
an employer intentionally discriminated against its employees. First,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence.77 This is accomplished by
showing that: (i) the plaintiff is in one of the protected classes (race,
sex, religion, or national origin); and (ii) the plaintiff is not treated as
well as a similarly situated employee not a member of the protected
class.78 If the employer succeeds, a presumption of discrimination is
72. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir.
1992).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
74. Title VII states, in relevant part:
(a) Employer practices [:] It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer- -(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
75. Bellace, supra note 41, at 680.
76. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
77. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
78. See id In McDonnell Douglas, a case where an African-American man was
not hired although qualified, the Court's four-part test to establish prima facie evi-
dence of discrimination necessitated the plaintiff showing
(i) that he belongs to racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
[Vol. 631470
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created.79 The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the alleged
discrimination.8' It is important to note that "the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."'"
The defendant employer, moreover, is not required to prove that it
followed the best employment procedures, but merely that its reasons
for abiding by the challenged procedure were not discriminatory8 2
Although an employer must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for following the specific employment practice, it does not
have to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive.83
If the defendant produces such a reason, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff, who must "prove that the legitimate reason offered was a
mere pretext for an illegal motive."" Recently, in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks,a the Court explained this burden switching by
stressing that after the employer provides its legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason, the presumption created by the plaintiff's prima facie
case drops out and the plaintiff must prove pretext.8 In St. Mary's,
the Court reversed a court of appeals decision holding that once the
plaintiff proved that all of the employer's proffered reasons for its ac-
tions were pretextual, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of lawY Thus, even though the district court found that all of St.
Mary's reasons were pretextual, the Court remanded the case so that
the trier of fact could "decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff
has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.
Id McDonnell Douglas also noted that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title Vfl
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent
is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802
n.13.
79. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
81. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
82. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
83. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24,25 (1978);
see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (stating that although proof of discriminatory motive is critical, "it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment").
84. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir.
1992). When plaintiff makes out her prima facie case, this "creates a presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee," Burdine, 450 U.S. at
254, "a presumption that can be rebutted, and hence its mandatory force obliterated,
by the production of admissible evidence setting forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action." Loyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 522
(7th Cir. 1994); see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. CL 2742, 2747-50 (1993).
85. 113 S. CL 2742 (1993).
86. SL Mary's Honor Ctr, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
87. Id. at 2748.
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[him]' because of his race."' Thus, even an adjudged lie by the em-
ployer will not necessitate a verdict for the plaintiff; she still must
prove intentional discrimination.
2. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact claims are those involving "employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity."89 In 1989, the Supreme Court in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio9 stated that a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination was made out by plaintiffs identifying
a specific or particular employment practice that "creates the dispa-
rate impact under attack."91 Once this has been shown, the plaintiffs
must provide statistical evidence "of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of appli-
cants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a pro-
tected group."'
After the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the case
shifts to the business justification phase.93 There are two components
to this phase: the consideration of justifications the employer offers
and "the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same busi-
ness ends, with less racial impact."94 With regard to justification, the
employer need only show that the employment practice served the
legitimate goals of the employer, 95 not that it is "essential" or "indis-
pensable" to her business.96 The Court in Wards Cove also noted that
88. Id. at 2749 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981)).
89. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977).
90. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
91. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). Furthermore,
"[r]acial imbalance in one segment of an employer's workforce does not, without
more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to the selection of
workers for the employer's other positions." Id. at 653. Rather, the plaintiff must
pinpoint a specific employment practice. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
92. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
93. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 659.
96. Id. The "business necessity defense" was first established by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court in Duke Power
noted: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431. The business neces-
sity defense, however, never implied that the practice was absolutely necessary to the
survival of the business. The employer, rather, had to show that the challenged em-
ployment practice was job related and that the business' legitimate goals were signifi-
1472 [Vol. 63
PAY EQUITY
the employer's burden is merely production of evidence, while the
burden of persuasion remains with the disparate impact plaintiffs.97
Furthermore, if the employer successfully shows justification, plain-
tiffs may still prevail by providing an alternative practice that would
serve the same goal, but without the similarly undesirable racial ef-
fect.98 If the plaintiff produces such an alternative and the employer
refuses to utilize it, "such a refusal would belie a claim by [the em-
ployer] that their incumbent practices are being employed for non-
discriminatory reasons."99 Thus, the plaintiff has a difficult burden as
the employer need not show necessity, but merely reasonable
justification."°
In 1991, however, Congress amended Title VII, alleviating the bur-
den on plaintiffs attempting to show disparate impact discrimina-
tion.1 1 The new section states:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is es-
tablished under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the re-
spondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job re-
lated for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.' 02
Thus, Congress codified what the Court had set out in Wards Cove.
Also, the amended statute mirrors the Court's language in Wards
Cove that if the plaintiff produces an alternative employment practice
and the employer refuses to adopt it, disparate impact discrimination
will be established.0 3 Finally, and most significantly, the amended
Act reverses Wards Cove by changing the employer's burden to pro-
duction and persuasion." The 1991 amendments, then, are helpful to
plaintiffs attempting to show disparate impact discrimination, but as
we will see, comparable worth is still not a cause of action under Title
VII.
Thus, disparate treatment discrimination occurs where the em-
ployer intentionally pays female employees less than male employees
in similar jobs whereas disparate impact discrimination involves a neu-
cantly served by the practice. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 587 n.31 (1979).
97. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
98. Id. at 660.
99. Id at 661.
100. See Michael J. Zimmer et. al., Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimi-
nation 361 (3d ed. 1994).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. V 1993).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (Supp V 1993).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (Supp. V 1993) ("The term 'demonstrates' means meets
the burdens of production and persuasion.").
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tral employment policy that compensates female employees less than
male employees.
3. Effects of Title VII on the Effort to Implement Comparable
Worth
The role of comparable worth in claims arising under Title VII is
defined by The Bennett Amendment, contained in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.1°5 This amendment states that Title VII is not violated
when an employer "differentiates upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of the wages or compensation paid.., if such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]. 1 °6 That
is, no discrimination exists if the employer can show one of the four
affirmative defenses stated in the EPA.
In County of Washington v. Gunther,l°0 however, the Supreme
Court held that the Bennett Amendment 08 was implemented to in-
corporate the affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII.10 9 That
is, "claims for sex-based wage discrimination can be brought under
Title VII even though no member of the opposite sex holds an equal
but higher paying job, provided that the challenged wage rate is not
based on seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or 'any
other factor other than sex.' ""I The Gunther Court held that the
Bennett Amendment should be construed as incorporating into Title
VII only the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act and not
the latter Act's requirement of equal work."' Thus, Title VII is
broader than the EPA, as equal work is not required.
After Gunther, however, the level of proof required to prevail on a
wage discrimination claim is quite specific, as "comparable worth" is
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
107. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
109. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981).
110. Id.
111. See id. (stating that the Bennett Amendment "was designed merely to incor-
porate the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII for sex-based
wage discrimination claims"). In Gunther, the county employed "matrons" to guard
female prisoners and it employed deputy sheriffs (later "correction officers") to guard
male prisoners. While the deputy sheriffs spent nearly all of their time on guard duty,
because there were few female prisoners, matrons spent a great deal of time doing
clerical work. When the complaint was filed in February of 1973, the monthly salary
range for the matrons' job was $525 to $668; for the deputy sheriff recruit it was $701
to $812; and for the deputy sheriff it was $736 to $940. Bellace, supra note 41, at 668
(citation omitted). Although the Court found that the matrons had been discrimi-
nated against, the ruling has been limited to the facts of the case where the employer's
actions were intentional and it undertook a job-evaluation survey that indicated that
the female jobs should be compensated more highly. Id. at 668-69.
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not a theory of liability under Title VII.1 12 The plaintiff must show an
intent to discriminate, and the intent must encompass an actual desire
to pay women less than men because they are women.113 This burden
on the plaintiff to show intent to discriminate is illustrated in
AFSCME v. Washington."' In AFSCME, the State of Washington
had commissioned a study that determined that female-dominated
jobs were paid an average of twenty percent less than male-dominated
jobs, even though the jobs were deemed to be of comparable worth.' 5
The court, in rejecting "comparable worth" theories of liability under
Title VII, noted that
[t]he State of Washington's initial reliance on a free market system
in which employees in male-dominated jobs are compensated at a
higher rate than employees in dissimilar female-dominated jobs is
not in and of itself a violation of Title VII, notwithstanding that the
Willis study deemed the positions of comparable worth. Absent a
showing of discriminatory motive, which has not been made here,
the law does not permit the federal courts to interfere in the mar-
ket-based system for the compensation of Washington's
employees.)'
Thus, Title VII does not include a cause of action for a comparable
worth theory of pay discrimination unless the plaintiff can prove that
the employer intentionally pays women less than their male counter-
parts. Once again, because the goal of comparable worth is to in-
crease the compensation of employees in occupations that have
traditionally been underpaid, the intent of the employer is irrelevant.
Some have called for a different interpretation of Title VII that would
include comparable worth as a cause of action." 7 It is evident, how-
112. Loyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing EEOC v.
Madison Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 587 (7th Cir. 1987)); see
American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. See Madison Community Unit Sch. DisL, 818 F.2d at 588.
114. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
115. 115. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. 1i at 1408; see Crain, supra note 18, at 28 (explaining that "comparable worth
strategies, which have transformative potential because they raise the question of the
intrinsic worth of work traditionally done by women, have met with a lukewarm re-
ception in the courts, in part because of their perceived efficacy in accomplishing a
transformation of the gendered wage labor market"); see also Christensen v. Iowa,
563 F.2d 353, 355-56 (8th Cir. 1977) (denying clerical workers' Title VII claim predi-
cated on disparate wages paid to predominantly female clerical workers and predomi-
nantly male physical plant workers because Title VII guarantees only equality of
opportunity); Lemons v. City of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 906, 909 (D.
Colo. 1978) (proclaiming that comparable worth claims have the potential to disrupt
the free market system in the United States), aff'd, 620 F.2d 228, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
888 (1980). See generally Linda M. Blum, Between Feminism and Labor. The Signifi-
cance of the Comparable Worth Movement 183-202 (1991) (examining the radical
possibilities of comparable worth).
117. See generally Lichtman Testimony, supra note 16 (noting how limited enforce-
ment of the equal pay laws hinders women and minorities in their fight for pay
equity).
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ever, that the government does not intent to extend Title VII this
broadly, and individual workers who feel strongly enough about com-
parable worth must take it upon themselves to fight for equal pay.
II. FAIR PAY Acr OF 1994
As the previous section illustrates, the current legislation does not
adequately protect against sex-based wage discrimination because it
does not provide a cause of action for comparable worth either
through the Equal Pay Act or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. As such, a new Act was introduced for debate in the House of
Representatives in the summer of 1994. This new act was intended to
address pay discrimination, and more importantly, to provide for
equal pay for comparable, though not necessarily equal, work." 8
A. The Act
In July of 1994, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton of the Dis-
trict of Columbia introduced the Fair Pay Act of 1994 ("FPA") in
front of the House Committee on Education and Labor." 9 The Act
would amend the Equal Pay Act 20 by adding:
No employer ... shall discriminate between its employees on the
basis of sex, race, or national origin by paying wages to employees
or groups of employees at a rate less than the rate at which the
employer pays wages to employees or groups of employees of the
opposite sex or different race or national origin for work in
equivalent jobs.' 21
The FPA defines "equivalent jobs" as "jobs that may be dissimilar, but
whose requirements are equivalent, when viewed as a composite of
skills, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.' 22 Thus, the
FPA would explicitly provide a cause of action for comparable worth.
The FPA also would allow, for the first time, class actions in equal pay
matters"a and would require employers to keep records of its wage
policies and make those records available for public inspection. 24
118. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on Select Edu-
cation and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (opening statement of Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
121. H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(G)(1)(a) (1994), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, BTX103 File.
122. Id. at § 3(G)(4)(b).
123. "Any such action may be maintained as a class action as provided by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at § 5(1)(O.
124. The public disclosure provision provides:
Every employer.., shall preserve records which document and support the
method, system, calculations, and other bases used by the employer in estab-
lishing, adjusting, and determining the wages paid to the employees of the
employer. Every employer.., shall preserve such records for such periods
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Currently, the FPA's status is still pending with thirty-six cospon-
sors; the last action was taken on October 3, 1994 when another spon-
sor signed on to the bill."2 To date, it has not been introduced to
committee, debated, or brought up for a vote." With the recent
changes in both the House and the Senate, it is unlikely that the FPA
will ever be passed. 127 Nonetheless, it is important to determine the
validity and desirability of the FPA, as the push for federal compara-
ble worth legislation is by no means dead. Moreover, as long as wo-
men and minorities are being under-paid, it is probable that individual
legislators will continue to introduce bills similar to the Fair Pay Act
of 1994.
B. Response to the Act
Immediately upon the introduction of the Bill, there was a great
deal of support for the Act from the unions,'2s the media, 2 9 and the
Institute for Women's Policy Research ("IWPR"). 130 Specifically, the
IWPR testified before Congress about its recently completed study of
pay equity programs in twenty state governments. According to the
IWPR, that study shows that the Fair Pay Act can131 and should be
of time and shall make such reports therefrom to the [EEOC] as shall be
prescribed by the [EEOCI by regulation or order as necessary or appropri-
ate for the enforcement of the provisions of Section 6 (g) or any regulations
promulgated thereunder... Every employer.., shall file annually with the
[EEOC] a report... containing information in such detail as may be neces-
sary accurately to disclose the wage or salary rates paid to each classification,
position, job title, or other wage or salary group of employees employed by
the employer, as well as the sex, race, and national origin of employees at
each wage or salary level in each classification, position, job title, or other
wage or salary group.
Id. at § 6(C)(2)(a), (b).
125. 140 Cong. Rec. H10533 (daily ed. October 3, 1994).
126. 1994 Bill Tracking H.R. 4803; 103 Bill Tracking H.R. 4803, 103rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bill Tracking File.
127. See World Politics and Current Affairs; AMERICAN SURVEY, The Econo-
mist, Nov. 12, 1994, at 29; Melissa Healy, Gingrich Lays Out Rigid GOP Agenda;
Congress: As Next House Speaker, Republican Lawmaker Says He Will 'Cooperate'
With Clinton. But He Vows No Compromise On His 10-Point Plan, L.A. Times, Nov.
12, 1994, at Al.
128. See The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Edu-
cation and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Robert M. Tobias), avail-
able in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony [hereinafter Tobias Testimony]; Sturdivant
Testimony, supra note 14.
129. See Martha Burk, After 30 Years, Let's Enforce Pay Equality, USA Today, July
21, 1994, (Editorial), at 8A; Judy Mann, Doing What's Fair on Payday, The Wash.
Post, July 15, 1994, at E3.
130. See The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcomm. on Select Edu-
cation and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Heidi I. Hartmann), avail-
able in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Hartmann Testimony].
131. "Can" meaning, it would be practical to do so: "it will be possible for firms to
meet the requirements of the proposed legislation and that implementing comparable
worth will help to close the pay gap between women and men." Id.
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implemented. 131 The IWPR's study drew five conclusions.133 First,
because the states were able to determine the content of their jobs in a
systematic way, they demonstrated that it is possible to compare jobs
within a single company.134 Second, because nearly all the states
found a pay gap between comparable female- and male-dominated
jobs, there is a problem that needs to be addressed. 35 Third, these
states were able to make adjustments to the pay of employees in un-
derpaid female-dominated job classes that substantially closed the pay
gap: making pay adjustments raises the wages of many women and
substantially closes the wage gap between men and women.'36 Fourth,
states that targeted specific underpaid female-dominated jobs spent a
relatively small portion of their wage bill on pay equity adjustments,
usually one percent or less. The pr6posed legislation would affect
only jobs that are found to be underpaid and would not ordinarily
require companies to redesign their entire personnel structures, so re-
form would tend to be moderate and inexpensive.' 37 And finally,
these remedies did not have the unfortunate side effects that many
economists predicted,138 such as causing unemployment or affecting
the pay and employment practices of other employees. Therefore,
companies would not have to fear that adjusting the wages of female-
dominated jobs found to be underpaid would significantly harm them
or their communities.139
Some have enthusiastically endorsed specific portions of the Act,
such as the public disclosure requirement 40 and the class action provi-
sion.14 1 An editorial in the USA Today noted:
Right now, the workplace double standard forces employees to sub-
mit to the most intrusive preemployment screenings-drug tests, in-
terviews with neighbors, school transcripts, traffic-ticket records and
credit reports. But job seekers or those who fear discrimination
can't get the simplest data from employers, such as aggregate earn-
ings information for women and men, or what proportion of eachjob category is female.' 42
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Steven E. Rhoads, Incomparable Worth: Pay Equity Meets the Market
34-35 (1993) (noting that those employers covered by comparable worth legislation
would be able to hire fewer employees, increasing the supply and further decreasing
wages in the sector not covered by comparable worth).
139. Hartmann Testimony, supra note 130.
140. Burk, supra note 129, at 8A; Mann, supra note 129, at E3.
141. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on Select Edu-
cation and Civil Rights on H.R. 4803 (1994) (statement of Gene R. Voegtlin), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Testimony File [hereinafter Voegtlin Testimony].
142. Burk, supra note 129, at 8A; see also Mann, supra note 129, at E3 (stating that
"[ilt is a disclosure that would go a long way to replacing the culture of secrecy that
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Likewise, during his testimony before the House Subcommittee, Gene
R. Voegtlin, a leader in the National Federation of Federal Employ-
ees, noted how the class action provision of the FPA would be a "seri-
ous deterrent to employers who would otherwise engage in
discriminatory pay practices. ' 143 Thus, the FPA might have been a
major asset in the struggle to equalize pay for all workers.
Others, however, will no doubt disagree with the FPA. For exam-
ple, Rector noted in 1989 that if the federal government got involved
in comparable worth legislation, "[t]o prevent over or undergrading
the government would have to monitor, regulate, and ultimately con-
trol all aspects of personnel administration within the private sector,
including job description, classification, and promotion."'14 This
would entail the "largest regulatory expansion in the history of the
American economy."' 45 In addition, opponents of government inter-
vention cite to a lack of objective means for evaluating jobs and the
possibility of creating disincentives for hiring female workers as rea-
sons why comparable worth is not a matter for the federal govern-
ment.' 46 Part III of this Note analyzes the reasons not to implement
comparable worth by means of the Fair Pay Act of 1994 or any other
federal legislation. 47
has allowed employers to discriminate against employees who have no way of know-
ing what their colleagues are being paid").
143. Voegtlin Testimony, supra note 141.
144. Rector, supra note 14.
145. Id
146. Id.
147. Some have even argued that the federal government would be a perfect place
to begin a series of pilot programs on pay equity while consideration of this legislation
is underway. Tobias Testimony, supra note 128; see also Weiler, supra note 34, at 1805
(stating that "[i]f the federal government, in particular, were to undertake a compre-
hensive reevaluation of its own pay structure and do it properly... this undertaking
would serve as a valuable demonstration project from which others could learn");
Sturdivant Testimony, supra note 14 ("The federal government is the largest employer
in the nation, and consequently has an obligation to eliminate all vestiges of discrimi-
nation against women and minorities").
Mr. Tobias, during his testimony, noted that women have been promoted less often
than men over the course of their government careers, even as they receive equal
performance appraisals and express just as much commitment to their jobs and career
advancement. Tobias Testimony, supra note 128. Mr. Tobias used the fact that the
federal classification system was implemented over 70 years ago, reflecting much of
the bias concerning female and minority job roles that "permeated" society 70 years
ago, to show that "[i]n the federal government women become stuck in undervalued
and undercompensated occupations." Id. Interestingly, the current federal job classi-
fication system was put in place three years before women were given the right to
vote in 1920. Id. Thus, it is evident that the federal government, as the nation's largest
employer, owes a duty to its citizens to reevaluate its own pay structure and take
positive steps to increase pay equity, hopefully leading the way for the rest of the
country.
1995] 1479
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
III. COMPARABLE WORTH SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON AN
INDIVIDUAL BASIS THROUGH THE EMPLOYEES'
BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES
The best reason for not passing the Fair Pay Act is that the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") already provides employees with
enough protection, allowing them to receive comparable worth pay
adjustments. The NLRA is not the same as the proposed FPA; it is
better. Instead of having federal judges determine proper pay scales
for individual employees, the NLRA allows these employees to deter-
mine for themselves, along with their employers, what the pay should
be. The NLRA, then, provides the mechanism whereby employees
can get comparable worth pay increases.
A. Duty to Bargain under the National Labor Relations Act
This section analyzes what an employer's duty to bargain about
comparable worth entails and what effect that has on employees seek-
ing comparable worth pay increases.
1. The Act
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act 148 compels em-
ployers to bargain collectively with employees through their elected
union representatives. 49 The duty to bargain is limited by section
8(d) of the Act passed in the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947,1-0
which provides that the duty to bargain applies solely to "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.''5
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988); see also Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargain-
ing, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1447, 1462 (1982) (stating that "the primary policy of the Labor
Act [is] to facilitate employees engaging in certain legitimate concerted efforts, such
as collective bargaining, [and to extract] from their employers more compensation for
their work"); Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal
Political Imagination, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 475, 477 (1983) [hereinafter Subjects of Bar-
gaining] ("Th[e] state-imposed duty constitutes a central component of the NLRA's
attempt to institutionalize industrial conflict and promote employee participation in
workplace governance.");.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
151. Id.; see Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1994 NLRB Lexis 256, at *16. The case
that first applied this principle is NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958). In that case, the Court noted that the Act treats as mandatory
bargaining subjects any feature of the employer-employee relationship that affects
" 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.' "Id. at 349 (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)).
For a criticism of the Court's handling of § 8(d), see Archibald Cox, Labor Deci-
sions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1074-86
(1958). The Article proclaims that "it is both unsound and inconsistent with the basic
philosophy of collective bargaining to license the NLRB and courts to determine the
scope of effective contract negotiations." Id. at 1083. Professor Cox concluded with
the hope that the Court will broaden its view of "terms and conditions of employ-
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Because comparable worth involves wages, any plan that seeks to
utilize it is a mandatory subject of bargaining and employers must bar-
gain with the union regarding its possible implementation until im-
passe.'5 2 The Fair Pay Act, therefore, is not only unnecessary, but as
the following discussion indicates, it is detrimental.
2. Advantages of Obtaining Comparable Worth through Collective
Bargaining
As courts constrict comparable worth theories as a cause of action
under Title VII,153 women must focus on organizational strategies and
collective action. One author notes: "Women must look . . . to un-
ions, whose role in the market is clear and whose competence in this
area is undenied."'' 14 As we have seen in Part I of this Note, federal
acts can be of limited use because judges limit their application; there-
fore, women and minorities are better off turning to unions who have
long gained benefits for their members.
One problem with federally mandated comparable worth is that not
all employees want it more than other benefits. Even if women or
racial minorities feel that they are being underpaid as compared to
white men, they may believe that other benefits are more important,
like health care or a pension plan. Traditional collective bargaining
involves a give-and-take process. When employees feel strongly about
ment" to include any bargaining proposal "not inconsistent with a federal statute or
declared public policy." Id. at 1086; see also Subjects of Bargaining, supra note 149, at
477 (stating that § 8 circumscribes the subjects of legally-mandated negotiation, thus
limiting employee participation in industrial decision-making).
152. See School District Must Bargain Pay Equity, At Least Partially, Iowa PERB
Holds, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 635 (stating that "[a] wage formula, a defini-
tion of comparable worth, and formation of a committee to study pay equity are
mandatory subjects for bargaining"). It is also important to note that the NLRA pro-
vides an affirmative duty for an employer to comply with a union's request for infor-
mation that will "assist the union in fufilling its responsibilities as the employees'
statutory representative," and a component of the employer's duty to bargain in good
faith. Southern Ohio Oil Coal Co., 1994 NLRB Lexis 19, at *32-33 (citing Detroit
Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979)); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432,
435-36 (1967). Thus, when a union comes to the bargaining table with pay equity in
mind, the employer must, even without the Fair Pay Act, open up her books and show
her pay scales and relevant statistical data. Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918 (1984)
(noting how the information simply needs to have some bearing on the issue for the
which the information is requested and be of "'probable or potential relevance to the
union's dut[y]'" (quoting Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982) (footnote omit-
ted in original)).
153. See supra part I.B.
154. Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational
Strategies, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 163, 182 (1986). For a detailed look at why collective
action strategies under the labor laws are superior to individual rights strategies, see
Crain, supra note 18, at 31-33.
14811995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
one benefit, they may be willing to give up another to ensure that they
receive that more-desired benefit. 155
By passing the FPA, the government would require employees to
take comparable worth in lieu of something that they may want
more.156 When an employer sits down with a union to bargain, it has a
limited amount of money to give to its workers. If the government
forces the workers to take comparable worth pay adjustments, the
pool of funds would necessarily be decreased, and other benefits
would have to be foregone. Where comparable worth is unregulated,
however, as it is now, if the workers want it, they can go to their
union' 57 and bargain with their employer to implement a comparable
worth program. 58
As one author notes, "[w]hat collective bargaining adds is both
meaningful participation by women in the process and the necessary
motivation to the employer to get it underway.' 59 Furthermore, an-
other author indicates that gender-conscious union activity could radi-
cally improve women's economic status.16° This latter author cites to
155. This statement, of course, assumes that workers will want different benefits.
For example, health care benefits have been important at the collective bargaining
table in recent years. Alan Finder, Health Care Costs Are the New Crux of Contract
Talks, N.Y. Tumes, Oct. 27, 1991, at Al; Peter J. Levin, 'Baby-Bell' Strike Raises
Health Insurance Issues, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 17, 1989, at 2.
156. This argument, then, does not address the issue of whether there is something
inherently valuable to equal pay, as in an elevated status for women and minorities.
This Note is not analyzing the sociological effects of lower pay or the potential benefit
to women as a group by the passage of the FPA. It is limited to looking at the in-
crease to wages and other side effects that directly relate to comparable worth pay
increases.
157. Or, if they are not unionized, they can join a labor organization.
158. See Gertner, supra note 154, at 177;
In the arenas where collective bargaining takes place, the focus can be on
bargaining directly or indirectly for comparable worth. Obviously, the par-
ties can adopt the practice of setting wages according to comparable worth
principles. Alternatively, they can bargain for a single, rational wage evalua-
tion plan .... [T]he absence of such a plan makes a crucial difference in
litigation-posing remedy problems in some cases, undermining the proof in
others.
Id.
159. Weiler, supra note 34, at 1799. Professor Weiler also noted that
[r]ather than call upon the law to regulate the market from the outside, one
could try to reconstruct the operation of the market so that women would be
better able to address the problem from the inside ... . Through union rep-
resentation, the employees in traditionally female jobs could obtain expert
technical assistance in identifying the actual degree of underpayment of their
work in their own particular workplace and then in bringing group pressure
to bear on their employer to do something about it.
Id. at 1798; see also Janet A. Flammang, The Implementation of Comparable Worth in
San Jose, in Comparable Worth, Pay Equity, and Public Policy 159, 186 (Rita Mae
Kelly & Jane Bayes eds., 1988) ("Comparable worth is well suited to the collective-
bargaining context, where it can be custom tailored to local needs and client groups
can make substantive contributions at both the policy-making and implementation
stages.").
160. Crain, supra note 18, at 30.
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a report by the AFL-CIO Public Employee Department on workers
earning poverty level wages. The report concludes that union mem-
bership does more to increase the incomes of women than does job
training, an additional year of education, or work experience. 61
3. Potential Drawbacks
Two potential drawbacks to the implementation of comparable
worth through collective bargaining are the low number of women in
unions and the problems that implementation may cause for unions
with a diverse membership. Historically, the organized labor move-
ment has not been kind to women.162 As of 1984, women made up
only 33.7% of all union members,163 with most of this unionization
occurring in the public sector.164 Forty-five percent of all female
unionists belong to only twenty-six national unions. 6' Almost sixty
percent of all national unions have less than twenty percent female
memberships, and seventy percent of all national unions have less
than thirty percent female memberships."6 Thus, with no pressure
from within, unions will not take comparable worth seriously. Even if
161. Id (citing Union Membership Most Effective Factor in Raising Wages of Poor
Report Says, 4 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 407 (Apr. 25, 1990) (citation omitted)). In 1989,
union women's median earnings were $417 per week, compared with $312 per week
for nonunion women. Id. Thus, women stand to gain a great deal by joining unions,
beyond obtaining comparable worth pay adjustments.
162. Blum, supra note 116, at 6. This attitude toward women has resulted in "the
exclusion of women from male unions and male occupations, and a lack of support for
organizing those employed in female occupations. Such tactics have reinforced the
sex segregation of the workforce and the marginalization of women workers." Id.; see
also Crain, supra note 18, at 30;
Historically, unions and women have been uneasy partners. Unions have a
well-documented history of sex discrimination and are characterized by an
overwhelmingly male culture. The image of the cigar-chomping, Mafia-con-
nected union business agent remains synonymous with the word 'union' in
most people's minds. Unions have been notoriously ineffective in organizing
women, and women are underrepresented in union staff and leadership
positions
Id
163. Blum, supra note 116, at 10 n.7; see also Weiler, supra note 34, at 1799 (noting
that a fundamental flaw with relying on collective bargaining to implement compara-
ble worth is the fact that women are so poorly represented). In the private sector,
only 10% of all female workers are in a union, making them half as likely as men to
be part of a labor organization. Id.
164. Blum, supra note 116, at 10. Within public sector unions, women make up
nearly 50%, as the demand for female labor grew dramatically with the growth of
state employment between 1950 and 1970. Id This, in turn, has lead to increased
attempts to implement comparable worth in the public sector. Kelly & Bayes, supra
note 27, at 8 ("[W]omen have been unionized at a relatively rapid rate in the public
sector, leading to substantial bargaining power for comparable worth").
165. Gold, supra note 1, at 92 (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of
National Unions, 62-63, tbl. 11).
166. Id
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it is, pay equity gains will be only minimal, as roughly twelve percent
of women are organized. 67
Comparable worth may also cause problems within the union and
within the context of collective bargaining. First, many employers
bargain with several different unions; if one union pushes for compa-
rable worth, the others will want to get involved to keep their workers
satisfied, and the result will be very complex bargaining. 168 As the
complexity of bargaining increases, the cost to all parties involved also
increases, especially to the employer. This further reduces the amount
of money available to the workers. Likewise, employers may poten-
tially use comparable worth to break-up unions' solidarity.169 For ex-
ample, if an employer has X amount of money to give wage increases,
it could play the membership of the union against itself. There may be
a split among union members regarding whether to use the additional
funds to increase women's salaries so that they are comparable to
equivalent jobs held by men, or to give across-the-board wage in-
creases that result in the same wage ratios between men and
women.170
4. Improvements in Labor Unions' Commitment to Comparable
Worth
The treatment of women by unions is improving, however, as the
percentages of women in unions increase. Statistics indicate that wo-
men are now joining unions in ever-increasing numbers. For example,
the growth in female white-collar union membership represents the
largest growth in the last fifteen years.' 7 ' Most of this growth has
taken place in public sector unions where women make up nearly half
the membership. 17
Additionally, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organization ("AFL-CIO") has endorsed comparable
worth. 73 In 1979, the AFL-CIO urged its affiliates "to adopt the con-
cept of equal pay for equal work of comparable value in organizing
and in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. 1 74
167. Id.
168. Id. at 91.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Blum, supra note 116, at 10 (citation omitted).
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 7.
174. Gold, supra note 1, at 87-88 (footnote omitted) (citing Bureau of National
Affairs, The Comparable Worth Issue, BNA Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Bu-
reau of National Affairs 1981, p.132)). Furthermore, other unions have joined the
fight: The International Union of Electrical Workers has filed several lawsuits, in-
cluding Gunther. See City of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Com-
munication Workers of America put comparable worth on the table with the Bell
System, and the United Electrical Workers, as early as 1970 in a contract with General
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Finally, the use of comparable worth could give this country's labor
movement a much-needed boost. By enticing more women to join
unions, a greater potential than just increased membership can be re-
alized by this "feminization" of the movement. There is a possible
"revitalization of the movement as women's concerns and greater
family orientation may provide a catalyst for humanizing the work-
place and the internal structure of unions .... [Perhaps] the full inclu-
sion of women can initiate a new 'social unionism,' reminiscent of the
militancy surrounding the great CIO industry organizing drives of the
1930s.,,175
B. Implications
This section analyzes and contrasts two comparable worth pro-
grams-a collective bargaining scenario and a mandated legislative
program. It will be evident that the former program has been more
successful, thus supporting the conclusion that the best route to imple-
menting pay equity is through individual bargaining, not government
intervention.
1. Case Study I: San Jose
The city of San Jose's implementation of comparable worth for mu-
nicipal employees exemplifies the benefits of comparable worth real-
ized through union-management bargaining.
a. Background
San Jose, located in Northern California, in the heart of the Silicon
Valley, had a booming economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 76
Furthermore, when the new City Council took office in January of
1981, seven of its eleven members were women, including a female
mayor, Janet Gray Hayes."r In fact, the Mayor called San Jose the
"feminist capital of the world." '178
The union representing about half of the city's four thousand work-
ers, Local 101 of the American Federation of State, County, and Mu-
nicipal Employees ("AFSCME"), drew many of its leaders from
predominantly female jobs, including the city librarians, clerical work-
ers, and recreation specialists, "who had long been concerned with
women's issues, including comparable worth." '179 Both the union and
the city enjoyed a climate of good-faith treatment and cooperation.18°
Electric, sacrificed money from a general pay increase to give an extra boost to wo-
men's jobs at the lower end of the scale. Gold, supra note 1, at 87-88.
175. Blum, supra note 116, at 11 (citation omitted).
176. Flammang, supra note 159, at 168.
177. Id at 168-70.
178. Killingsworth, supra note 34, at 184.
179. Id
180. Flammang, supra note 159, at 168-70.
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Nevertheless, when collective bargaining began in 1978, the city gov-
ernment "had no desire to explore the . . . comparable worth
concept.'' l
b. The Agreement
In December of 1980, the city released the results of a study con-
ducted by the Hay Associates showing that the wages in female-domi-
nated jobs"8 were less than those paid in male-dominated jobs of
equal "points."'183 Points were assigned to jobs according to four crite-
ria: knowledge, problem-solving, accountability, and working
conditions.?84
In the winter of 1981, AFSCME and the City Council began to ne-
gotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. 185 The union bar-
gained for a ten percent cost-of-living increase and $3.2 million in
comparable worth adjustments over four years; the city countered
with a six percent cost-of-living increase and $1.3 million in compara-
ble worth adjustments over two years. 86
After reaching an impasse early in the summer of 1981, the union
voted to strike, initiating "the first comparable worth strike in the na-
tion and a rare disturbance in the city's normally tranquil labor rela-
tions.' 87 The strike lasted nine days and resulted in the City Council
voting to pay roughly $1.45 million over two years in comparable
worth pay adjustments."
c. The Results
Public policy analysts indicate four scenarios in which the successful
implementation of the city counsel's decision is unlikely.'89 First, the
analysts explain the Resistance to Innovation scenario.9 0 Under this
scenario, pressure from interest groups-business, elected officials,
and personnel administrators-stalls attempts to implement a policy
as controversial and innovative as comparable worth.' 9' Second, the
analysts set forth the The Grandstanding Without Follow-through Sce-
181. Killingsworth, supra note 34, at 184 (citation omitted).
182. Those jobs that were greater than 70% female were considered female-domi-
nated. Flammang, supra note 159, at 160.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Flammang, supra note 159, at 160.
188. Id. Furthermore, as a result of the collective bargaining agreement, $116,000
was spent on comparable worth in 1983, another $171,000 in 1984, and $341,000 in
1985. Blum, supra note 116, at 89-90.
189. Flammang, supra note 159, at 161-65.
190. Id. at 161-62.
191. Id. Negative press came from a wide variety of sources, such as an editorial in
the Wall Street Journal, an article in Fortune Magazine, the EEOC Advisory Council,
Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, and San Jose Council Member Claude Fletcher. Id.
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nario.192 In this case, elected officials get political mileage from
merely studying comparable worth but have little incentive to actually
implement it.193 Third, analysts propose The Court-Mandated Imple-
mentation Scenario. 94 Under this scenario, "[ilt [is] plausible to as-
sume that AFSCME would have to engage in a protracted court battle
with San Jose to implement the findings of the Hay study."'195 Finally,
the Fiscal Constraint Scenario disfavors implementation of compara-
ble worth because of the economic policy during the Reagan years
and the overall cut-back in government, as evidenced by California's
Proposition 13.196 Basically, this scenario suggests that the govern-
ment would be unwilling or unable to conduct a drastic, costly social
experiment at this time."9
Despite the analysts' bleak propositions, 98 San Jose's comparable
worth program has been a success in large part because of the collec-
tive bargaining setting in which is was implicated. Specifically:
[Tihe collective-bargaining setting meant that the union had proce-
dural access, both legally and informally, to the decision-making
process. It had detailed knowledge of what the council intended,
and it had the necessary time, energy, information, financial incen-
tive, and experience. Procedural channels increase the likelihood of
an implementation in the direction of the watchdog scrutinizingi199
it.,
d. The Implications
The success of San Jose's movement is significant in three very im-
portant respects. First, because women were disappointed with the
results of Affirmative Action, which was mandated through legisla-
tion, they realized that "the only effective way to gain comparable
worth was through union action." 2°° Second, the San Jose case shows
how effective a union can be when it takes at least partial control of
192. Id- at 162-63.
193. Id
194. Flammang, supra note 159, at 160.
195. Id. at 164.
196. Id. at 164-65.
197. Id.
198. See e.g., Killingsworth, supra note 34, at 212 ("[E]stimates indicate that San
Jose's comparable worth pay adjustments may have raised wages by between 5.7 per-
cent and 5.8 percent in female jobs, and had negligible effects on pay in male jobs. As
a result, the six years of comparable worth wage adjustments in San Jose had a negli-
gible effect on employment in male jobs, and may have reduced employment in fe-
male jobs by between 6.55 percent to 6.67 percent-roughly the equivalent of
somewhat less than a year of lost employment growth.").
199. Flammang, supra note 159, at 173. But cf. Gold, supra note 1, at 90 ("[Tihe
labor movement is [not] as firmly committed to comparable worth as [some may
think]. It is no coincidence that the mayor and a majority of the city council of San
Jose were women. The politicians wanted comparable worth ... as much as the
union.").
200. Blum, supra note 116, at 90.
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the "technically mystified job evaluation process" away from manage-
ment's so-called experts.20 1 Finally, on a national level, the union's
"tough politics" showed just how effective comparable worth could be
and just what could be gained through the unity of an aggressive labor
and feminist campaign.2
San Jose is an example of how a local union can obtain comparable
worth pay increases for its workers. Through collective bargaining,
women and minorities can get deserved pay equity wage increases
without having to rely on questionable federal legislation and a dis-
trict court judge's interpretation of "equal jobs." Through the combi-
nation of a re-vitalized labor movement and the aggressive activity of
the feminist and minority coalitions, comparable worth could be im-
plemented without federal legislation such as the Fair Pay Act of 1994.
2. Case Study II: Iowa
In contrast to San Jose, Iowa has tried to implement legislation to
combat wage discrimination. Unlike San Jose, however, Iowa was not
successful.
a. The Legislation
In 1983, the Iowa General Assembly passed H.F. 313203 which pro-
vided " 'that a state department, board, commission, or agency shall
not discriminate in compensation for work of comparable worth be-
tween jobs held predominantly by women and jobs held predomi-
nantly by men.' ,2o4 The statute defined comparable worth as " 'the
value of work as measured by the composite of the skill, effort, re-
sponsibility, and working conditions normally required in the per-
formance of work.' "o205
b. The Agreement
On March 29, 1985, some 9500 Iowa state employees received their
first pay raise as a result of the new legislation. 0 The pay raise was in
201. Id. at 91.
202. Id. The phenomenon of striking over comparable worth has spread from
northern California to the rest of the country. At two venerable Ivy League institu-
tions, Yale and Columbia, secretaries have struck over a number of things, including
comparable worth. For more information, see William Serrin, Columbia Faces Threat
of Strike Over Union Vote, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 31, 1984, at A28; William Serrin, Yale
Strike is Watched by Unions Across the U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1984, at B4; see also
Wayne King, When Drivers Earn Far More Than Secretaries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1989, at B1 (examining the plight of secretaries at Hofstra University on Long Island).
203. Hugh Winebrenner, The Implementation of Comparable Worth in Iowa, in
Comparable Worth, Pay Equity, and Public Policy 213, 213 (Rita Mae Kelly & Jane
Bayes eds., 1988).
204. Id.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. BNA Survey Finds 23 States Are Taking Comparable Worth Actions, 69 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-i (April 10, 1985).
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response to a $150,000 study conducted by Arthur Young and Com-
pany of 758 job classifications covering 18,000 state employees. 207
The study found that 10,700 employees should get pay raises and
7300 should get pay cuts. Nevertheless, budget constraints and the
political problem surrounding pay cuts forced the state and the union,
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
("AFSCME"), to negotiate a deal whereby some employees deserving
equity pay raises did not receive them.20 Some 1800 nonunion em-
ployees received their pay raise while another 2000 saw their wages
frozen?0 9 Thus, where the government mandated comparable worth
to employees, only some of whom were covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, the full benefit of the program was not realized.
c. The Problem
From the beginning, Iowa's comparable worth program has met dif-
ficulties in implementation, as well as objections from the parties in-
volved, including the unions.210 There are many different reasons why
Iowa has not been as successful with its comparable worth program as
San Jose.
First, the General Assembly involved itself far too long with the
implementation process. This delay led to a confrontation with the
Executive Branch over who would actually be in charge of making
sure Iowa's employees received the pay equity they deserved.211 Spe-
cifically, the steering committee appointed by the Governor to facili-
tate the introduction of comparable worth believed that the governor
was engaging in the "grandstanding without follow-through scena-
rio," '212 forcing them to remain involved too long. As one author
notes, "the steering committee had neither the time nor the expertise
to implement comparable worth and demonstrated that policy imple-
mentation is better left to professionals."21 In contrast, when compa-
rable worth is implemented through collective bargaining, all parties
are familiar with the circumstances and have the time and the desire
to see that the best possible program is instituted.
Second, Iowa's program was fragmented from the beginning. Each
individual state department, board, commission, and agency was
207. Id. at C-2. The report concluded that jobs held predominantly by women were
paid 30 to 32% less than jobs held predominantly by men "entailing the same respon-
sibility, effort, and working conditions-the basic comparable worth values." Id.
208. Id.
209. Id
210. See Winebrenner, supra note 203, at 221 ("The implementation of comparable
worth in Iowa has been a nightmare."). But cf Michael, supra note 14, at 3B (noting
that Iowa's comparable worth plan cut the state's gender wage gap in half, to three
percent).
211. Winebrenner, supra note 203, at 213.
212. Id. at 222; see supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
213. Winebrenner, supra note 203, at 222.
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forced to comply, but the pay study conducted by the Steering Com-
mittee involved only 20,000 merit system jobs; about 13,000 employ-
ees of the regents, judicial, legislative, and executive exempt systems
were excluded.2 1 This limited sample detracts from the study because
accuracy in statistical surveys increases as the numbers increase. In a
collective bargaining situation, it is highly likely that all workers will
be included in the survey, thereby assuring the most accurate wage
survey possible.
Furthermore, because each department used a different job evalua-
tion methodology and study, similar jobs in different departments
could be assigned unequal pay.215 For example, a guard in the court-
house could receive different pay than a guard in the library. A major
component of employee satisfaction is not only the level of pay re-
ceived, but the perceived fairness her pay brings in comparison to sim-
ilarly situated coworkers. In a collective bargaining scenario, the
union will be concerned that its workers not only receive the highest
pay possible, but also that workers performing the same jobs are paid
the same wage rate.
Third, a whole variety of problems commonly known as "pay com-
paction" occurred. 1 6 Pay compaction" 'result[s] when current salary
distances between levels of job classes in the same job classification
series are insufficient to reflect recognized differences in responsibil-
ity, skill (knowledge and ability), and effort, or when statutorily man-
dated or otherwise fixed salary ceilings arbitrarily and artificially limit
salary levels.' "217 One example of pay compaction problems is the
"reduction of existing supervisory-subordinate pay differentials."2 8
Likewise, a different problem, that of inversion of classes within a se-
ries, occurred. This involves the lower-ranked employee, through
comparable worth, earning more than the higher-ranked employee. 19
214. Id. at 217.
215. Id. Like the problem in Iowa, Richard Burr, research analyst at the Center for
the Study of American Business, Washington University, noted the arbitrariness of
comparable worth programs throughout the country. Richard E. Burr, Rank Injustice:
The Arbitrary Record of Comparable Worth, The Heritage Found. Pol'y Rev., 1986
Fall, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File. An example of this arbitrariness
occurs between Iowa and Minnesota, where a photographer in Minnesota is worth
25% more than one in Iowa while a Minnesota librarian is worth 30% more than a
Vermont librarian, who in turn is worth 20% more than a fellow librarian in Iowa. Id.
Thus, as Burr notes, the entire validity of comparable worth programs is questionable
due to the inconsistency of programs from state to state. Id.
216. Winebrenner, supra note 203, at 217-18.
217. Id. (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 218.
219. Id. An example of this occurred when a conservation aide, a summer em-
ployee who picks up debris and pulls weeds, earned $4.40 per hour before the study
and a conservation worker, a full-time employee whose duties include collecting
brood fish and eggs for propagation and planting wildlife habitats, earned $5.88 per
hour. After the study and implementation of comparable worth, the aide earned
$6.10 while the worker remained the same. Id.
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For obvious reasons, this could cause major problems for employees,
and collective bargaining would avoid inversion altogether as unions
are constantly comparing figures to ensure that pay increases as re-
sponsibility increases.
Finally, Iowa's comparable worth program was muddled because
the state had collective bargaining agreements that needed to be rene-
gotiated with approximately seventy percent of the merit system em-
ployees.31°  The city and the union (AFSCME) agreed to
implementation, but watered it down greatly by rejecting downgrades
and employee appealsY'l Thus, by not involving the union from the
outset, Iowa ran into problems when AFSCME tried to prevent any
reduction in the pay of its male members. Because comparable worth
will be achieved only if the desire exists, forcing the issue can cause
resentment and opposition.
Moreover, the use of legislation risks commissioning inaccurate
studies. Although this was not a problem in Iowa, "[m]any pressing
employee concerns are considered to be beyond the reach of sensible
legal intervention, including the obvious issue of what wages and ben-
efits should be paid for the host of different jobs in our vast and de-
centralized economy." m  Moreover, legislatures have avoided
commissioning studies to analyze pay equity tm
Iowa is an example of legislature-mandated comparable worth.
Although some states and cities have fared better, a Iowa shows how
things can go wrong when the parties involved do not make the deci-
sions regarding the implementation of comparable worth.
C. Best Alternative
Throughout the 1980s, no labor policy issue was more hotly con-
tested than comparable worth. Those in favor saw a great opportunity
to increase the pay of women employed in jobs that had been assigned
220. Id. at 219. State Comptroller William Krahl said, in 1984, that Iowa's new
comparable worth law is incompatible with collective bargaining. Comparable Worth
in Rough Waters, UPI, Dec. 30, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
221. Winebrenner, supra note 203, at 219. Apparently, the union did not want to
upset its male members and the governor wanted to protect the state treasury. This
"caused both parties to lose sight of the goal of comparable worth-pay equity for all
employees." Id Furthermore, other unions were dissatisfied with the outcome of the
agreement between AFSCME and the state. Specifically, representatives of the 600-
member Iowa United Professionals (IUP) were upset, claiming the agreement did not
treat them fairly, and, more importantly, denies IUP the right to bargain for its own
members. Scott Sonner, Avenson and Branstad Spar Over Equity Bill, UPI, Mar. 14,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
222. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employ-
ment Law 154 (1990).
223. Id.
224. See generally Sara M. Evans & Barbara J. Nelson, Comparable Worth for Pub-
lic Employees: Implementing a New Wage Policy in Minnesota, in Comparable Worth,
Pay Equity, and Public Policy 191-212 (Rita Mae Kelly & Jane Bays eds., 1988) (ex-
aining the implementation of comparable worth in the state of Minnesota).
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historically to them, such as secretaries or nurses.225 Those opposed
to comparable worth viewed it as an infringement on a free market
economy with the potential to wreak havoc on the employment of
women by increasing their cost to employers, thus effectively provid-
ing a dissincentive to hire them.2 6
Congress has alleviated some of the problems regarding the plight
of women and minorities in the workplace by passing the Equal Pay
Act of 1963227 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 These
acts, however, do not go far enough. The EPA does not provide a
cause of action for comparable worth pay disparities as plaintiffs must
show that their jobs are identical to a comparator's job.22 9 As compa-
rable worth aims to raise the pay level for jobs of similar skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions, the EPA is contrary to the
heart of comparable worth. Furthermore, Title VII does not allow a
plaintiff to bring an action in federal court for comparable worth, as
she must show an intent to discriminate encompassing an actual desire
to pay women less than men, which is not a requirement in the typical
comparable worth scheme.230
While the FPA would resolve some of the flaws in the EPA and
Title VII, it is unlikely that it would better protect individuals against
pay discrimination. Although comparable worth is no doubt an im-
portant and necessary tool to bring women and minorities' pay up to
the level it should be, federal legislation is not the proper method to
obtain this level.
Under the National Labor Relations Act,"' employers have a duty
to bargain with their employees over wages, hours, and working con-
ditions.3 2 As a component of wages, employers are compelled to bar-
gain over comparable worth. Thus, employees who desire comparable
worth can exert economic pressure and, perhaps, give up another ben-
efit to get it.
The city of San Jose provides an excellent example to unions
throughout the country regarding securing comparable worth pay in-
creases. The union must be united, the employer must be fairly recep-
tive, and there must be enough money in the coffers to cover the
added increase in labor costs. If the government were to mandate
employers to implement comparable worth, the favorable factors may
not exist and the situation could become complicated, as was the case
in Iowa.
225. See Rhoads, supra note 138, at 7-9.
226. Id. at 9-16.
227. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
229. See supra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
231. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
232. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
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Thus, employees should go to their unions (or join unions if they
are not already organized) and put pressure on employers to finally
end the discrimination that deprives women and minorities of equal
pay. Only then, after every employee receives the pay that he or she
deserves, can the United States truly be a country that allows an indi-
vidual to succeed by hard work and an incentive to get ahead.
CONCLUSION
Recall the case of Marilyn Jancey, the cafeteria worker who was
denied equal pay. Some may say that she was fortunate, because the
state she lives in, Massachusetts, has an Equal Pay Act prohibiting
employers from discriminatorily paying female workers less than male
workers for jobs of comparable worth." 3 Proponents of comparable
worth legislation would, then, favor the passage of the Fair Pay Act of
1994, sponsored by Representative Eleanor Holmes-Norton of the
District of Columbia.
The proposed federal legislation, however, is not the best way to
bring about pay increases for women and minorities. The federal gov-
ernment already has passed numerous laws that go a long way to
equalizing the workplace: the National Labor Relations Act, The
Equal Pay Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. What we have in
place is the framework for achieving comparable worth without fur-
ther government intervention. Instead of waiting for help from the
government, it is imperative that individual workers take it upon
themselves to get what they deserve by exerting economic pressure on
their employers to get comparable worth pay increases. Thus, the best
way to ensure equal pay for women is through collective bargaining.
The National Labor Relations Act already provides the mechanism
whereby employees can bargain to increase pay equity in the
workplace.
233. See Massachusetts Equal Pay Act, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 105A (Law. Co-
op 1994).
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